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Abstract
The paper offers an analysis of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the production and 
comprehension of verbal jokes in terms of what relevance theorists refer to as weakly com-
municated import. While pragmatic analyses of humour emphasize the role of the inferen-
tial stages that the audience is intended (or even manipulated, Yus 2016) to go through in 
processing a joke, the weak communication model presented here focuses on the punch-
line effect, exploring the nature of the “cognitive climax” that is created. On this account, 
a vast array of weakly communicated assumptions, resulting in a cognitive overload effect, 
rather than incongruity resolution on its own, is identified as the laughter-inducing mech-
anism underlying verbal humour. The central idea is that universal and culture-specific 
humour-generating elements in jokes have one quality in common, viz. their potential to 
cause a cognitive overload effect, which may, and often does, result in amusement. On this 
approach, what is typically recognized as national or ethnic humour is posited to recruit 
the same humour-invoking pragmatic mechanisms as in other kinds of jokes, the principal 
difference lying in the choice of the target being mocked, which must be well-known to the 
audience for the cognitive overload effect to be brought forth. 
Keywords
joke, relevance theory, weak communication, cognitive effect, comprehension heuristic, 
humour target
Streszczenie
Artykuł przedstawia analizę mechanizmów poznawczych stanowiących podłoże humoru 
w dowcipach słownych, wykorzystującą pojęcie tzw. słabej komunikacji, zaproponowane 
przez teorię relewancji. Podczas gdy większość pragmatycznych modeli humoru podkreśla 
rolę rozwiązania inkongruencji oraz poszczególnych etapów inferencyjnych, przez które 
odbiorca jest planowo prowadzony w interpretacji żartów (por. Yus 2016), przedstawiona 
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tu analiza tłumaczy efekt humorystyczny przez pryzmat swoistego „przeciążenia poznaw-
czego”, które towarzyszy przetwarzaniu pointy dowcipu. W tym ujęciu wiele słabo komuni-
kowanych informacji, do których odbiorca nagle uzyskuje dostęp w momencie, gdy dowcip 
się kończy, tworzy efekt przeciążenia poznawczego dający impuls do reakcji afektywnej. 
Analiza humoru na gruncie pojęcia słabej komunikacji wskazuje, że wspólnym mianowni-
kiem tekstów uznawanych za śmieszne pod każdą szerokością geograficzną i tzw. humoru 
etnicznego czy narodowego jest to, że kluczowe pojęcia i postaci w tekście, stanowiące cel 
satyry, muszą (przynajmniej potencjalnie) dawać dostęp do całego wachlarza informacji, 
gdyż w innym wypadku efekt słabej komunikacji nie zaistnieje. O śmieszności dowcipu 
przesądza zatem nie samo zrozumienie jego treści i pointy, ale osiągnięcie specjalnego 
efektu poznawczego. 
Słowa kluczowe
dowcip, teoria relewancji, efekt poznawczy, heurystyka rozumienia wypowiedzi, obiekt 
humoru
1. Introduction 
Humour has attracted considerable attention of researchers from quite dispa-
rate fields ranging from philosophy to neuropsychology. Various aspects of hu-
mour, such as topics, recurrent schemas, functions, or pragmatic mechanisms 
involved in their interpretation have been studied by researchers representing 
different theoretical frameworks. In this paper we adopt a relevance-theoretic 
perspective on communication to investigate how universal pragmatic mecha-
nisms are combined with culture-specific assumptions to generate an expected 
response to jokes, arguing for a peculiar weak communication effect that the 
punch-line sparks off (Jodłowiec and Piskorska 2017). 
In particular, verbal jokes have been the subject of investigation of human 
communication researchers, among them also those working within the rele-
vance-theoretic framework. Most pragmatic analyses so far (e.g. Suls 1972, 1983; 
Richie 2004; Dynel 2012; Yus 2016), however, have focused on incongruity and 
its resolution, addressing various possible types of opposition between a joke 
set-up and its punch-line. Yet, as pointed out by McGraw and Warner (2014), re-
solving incongruity may not necessarily lead to amusement, which suggests that 
further questions about the nature of humour should be asked. This paper there-
fore seeks to push the boundaries of the pragmatics of humour beyond the con-
fines of the incongruity resolution paradigm and to offer an explanation of the 
humorous effect in terms of weak communication – a phenomenon responsible 
for many other subtle effects human communication can create.  
Combining the weak communication perspective on humour with consid-
erations of motives and themes particularly suitable to be exploited in jokes, we 
aim to tease out the universal elements from culture-specific ones. We intend 
to demonstrate that the widely attested phenomenon of joking about a familiar 
social or ethnic group can be adequately explained in terms of the processing 
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mechanism we propose for humour and, in particular, the specific cognitive cli-
max that occurs when the punch-line is processed. It needs to be stressed at the 
outset that this paper is not concerned with a cross-cultural study of jokes and 
its focal point has to do with the special cognitive effects that accompany the in-
terpretation of the punch-line. The examples of jokes targeting various ethnic or 
social groups used throughout the text serve illustrative purposes only.
In the next section we shall introduce some basic notions of the relevance-
theoretic pragmatics together with the most important accounts of humour 
proposed in this framework. Then, we will present the notion of weak commu-
nication, demonstrating how it can be applied to humour analysis. A number 
of jokes will be used to illustrate the interaction of the pragmatic mechanism 
postulated with background assumptions about groups targeted as victims of 
jokes. Finally, some conclusions will be offered focusing on the explanatory 
value of the account developed in this paper.
2. Humour and incongruity: relevance-theoretic 
analyses
 
Linguistic-pragmatic approaches to humour, to which our study belongs, typ-
ically draw on the philosophical notion of incongruity originating from the 
works of Kant and developed in the 20th century by Suls (1972, 1983), Fora-
bosco (1992), Richie (2004), Dynel (2009, 2012) and many others. Incon-
gruity is often treated as a necessary condition for humour and is further in-
corporated into a specific linguistic or pragmatic paradigm, such as Grice’s 
theory of implicatures (Attardo 1993), semantic scripts theory (Attardo and 
Raskin 1991), cognitive linguistics (Turner 2010; Dynel 2011a; Attardo 2015; 
Chłopicki 2017) or relevance theory.  Since the latter is the framework adopted 
in this analysis, below we shall present its basic tenets, followed by a brief over-
view of relevance-theoretic contributions devoted to humour.
Relevance theory is an ostensive-inferential model of communication, in 
which the intention to convey certain content is fully overt and the recipient is 
expected to infer this content on the basis of the input produced by the com-
municator. Utterance comprehension is postulated to involve the formulation 
and evaluation of hypotheses about the intended meaning on the basis of the 
evidence in the form of an utterance provided by the speaker for precisely this 
purpose (Sperber and Wilson 2002: 7). In the relevance-theoretic framework, 
the process of comprehension is seen as governed by a single principle, known 
as the communicative principle of relevance: “Every act of ostensive commu-
nication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber 
and Wilson 1986/95: 260).
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In practical terms, the principle stipulates that the comprehension process 
is geared towards optimizing relevance, i.e. obtaining adequate cognitive ben-
efits for a justifiable processing effort expended by the mind. Thus, when Mag-
gie says to Tom 
(1) Have you seen my ring?
of all the possible interpretations (e.g. Maggie is asking Tom to help her find 
a piece of jewellery, she is worried that her piece of jewellery has been sto-
len, she wants to attract his attention to the fact that she has a new ring on her 
finger or to the fact that she got engaged, etc.), the one that brings about the 
optimum balance between the range of cognitive effects and the processing 
cost will surface as the interpretation manifestly intended by the speaker.  This 
means that in his pursuit for optimal relevance the hearer applies the following 
comprehension heuristic: 
a.  Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test inter-
pretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implica-
tures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
b.  Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (Wilson and 
Sperber 2004: 613; cf. also Wilson and Sperber 2012: 7).
The heuristic underlies the recovery of both the explicit and implicit con-
tent. Assuming, as most pragmaticists do (i.a. Bach 1994, 2010; Hamb-
lin and Gibbs 2003; Levinson 2000; Recanati 2004), that verbal communi-
cation involves these two levels of meaning, Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 
182) define explicitly communicated import, or explicature, as an inferen-
tial development of the logical form encoded by an utterance to full prop-
ositionality, adequately embedded under a higher level description of 
the illocutionary force if necessary (cf. Carston 2002), and implicature as 
any assumptions “communicated, but not explicitly” (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/95: 182).
Returning to example (1), the comprehension process stops when Tom ar-
rives at (1a), since this interpretation immediately satisfies his expectations of 
relevance as it requires the least processing effort if we stipulate that (1b) and 
(1c) are highly accessible to him. 
(1) a. Maggie is looking for her wedding ring. 
b. Maggie puts her wedding ring on when she is going out. 
c. Maggie is going out. 
On the explicit side then, the hearer disambiguates the NP “ring” as “a piece 
of jewellery” rather than some other kind of ring; he also fixes the temporal 
scope of the Present Perfect to a fairly recent event and modulates the meaning 
of the verb “see” beyond mere perception to locating the whereabouts of the 
ring. All this is posited to take place through a series of inferential tasks that 
29Weak Communication, Joke Targets and the Punch-Line Effect...
run in parallel and are responsible for identifying the context-intended speak-
er meaning, conveyed both in the explicit and implicit way.1 
As emphasized in the relevance-theoretic framework, for an act of com-
munication to be successful, the speaker has to be able to predict, at least to 
some degree, the inferential path the hearer is most likely to follow. This kind 
of mind-reading is possible because the speaker shares a part of cognitive envi-
ronment with the hearer and therefore has good grounds for predicting which 
contextual assumptions are available to the hearer and will be used in the pro-
cessing of an utterance. 
This observation underlies all the relevance-theoretic models of joke com-
prehension. In the one put forward by Francisco Yus (2003, 2008, 2013, 2016), 
it is posited that the set-up of a joke typically prompts the recipient to follow 
a certain possible line (or several lines) of interpretation, based on the predic-
tion which contextual premises are easily accessible. The punch-line being in-
congruous with the interpretation(s) cued by the set-up causes a sudden twist 
in the processing, leading to a surprising interpretation, which Yus (2003) re-
fers to as the Multiple-Graded-Interpretations/Single-Covert-Interpretation joke 
schema. This can be illustrated with the following example, cited in Yus (2008):
(2) Mr. Isar was attending his friend’s wife’s funeral. “It must be hard to lose a wife,” 
remarked Mr. Isar. “Almost impossible,” remarked his friend.  (Yus 2008: 146–47) 
Here, the funeral situation will naturally make the interpretation of  “hard to 
lose a wife” as “difficult to face a wife’s death” highly accessible to the audience, 
and it is very likely that this will be the only interpretation that will occur to 
them at this point. The punch-line “Almost impossible” introduces incongruity 
and leads to the realization that this is not the interpretation that the receiver 
of the condolences has found the most salient. Although the second interpre-
tation could have been – in theory – developed by the joke’s audience at the 
set-up stage, this did not happen because of its low accessibility. 
This fact, of which the author of the joke is perfectly aware, lies at the core 
of the humour mechanism: since the expectations of relevance invariably bias 
the hearer towards the most accessible interpretation, the less accessible one 
will not be retrieved. Then, a sudden twist from the first hypothesis to the in-
terpretation imposed by the punch-line (here from condolences to the absurd 
idea of wife as “lost property”) evokes a humorous response.  
It has to be noted that the potential for the two different interpretations, pre-
sent in the joke set-up but meant to pass unnoticed, lies in the ambiguity of 
the words “hard” and “lose” and can therefore be connected with one of the 
1  There are different views on the actual types and number of these processes within rel-
evance-theoretic pragmatics (see Carston 2010c; Jodłowiec 2015). Addressing these issues in 
detail is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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inferential comprehension processes leading to the recovery of the utterance ex-
plicit content, namely disambiguation. Yus (2008, 2016) claims that all inferen-
tial processes involved in constructing the explicit and implicit layer of meaning 
can be likewise capitalized on to generate humour. The case of exploiting impli-
catures for conveying humour is shown in (3) (adapted from Yus 2008):
(3)  Matt’s dad asked his son if he got a part in a school play. Matt enthusiastically an-
nounced that he’d gotten a part of a man who’s been married for twenty years. 
“That’s great, son,” replied the father. “Keep up the good work and before you know 
it they’ll be giving you a speaking part.”
Here, incongruity can be spotted between the assumption that the boy was giv-
en a major role (implicated by the father’s remark “That’s great”) and the im-
plicature conveyed by the final statement, namely, that the part is a silent one. 
Again, the initial easily accessible interpretation invited by the set-up requires 
a reinterpretation when the punch-line is being processed. 
As demonstrated by Yus (2013, 2016), to exploit the potential afforded by 
inferential mechanisms for humorous purposes, humourists often rely on vari-
ous kinds of knowledge, referred to as make-sense frames and cultural frames. 
The former is a set of background assumptions which make the joke scenario 
coherent, whereas the latter refer to the assumptions believed to be shared by 
members of a culture in which the joke is rooted. For example, the make-sense 
frame activated in joke (2) is a funeral scenario, in which people convention-
ally express grief, pay condolences, etc., whereas in joke (3) the scenario is that 
of a father-son conversation. The cultural frames activated in both jokes in-
volve widespread stereotypical assumptions about the roles of men and wom-
en in marriages. Yus (2013, 2016) rightly notes that humour in the majority of 
jokes arises out of simultaneous exploitation of inferential mechanisms and the 
above-mentioned two kinds of frames. His Intersecting Circles Model, in which 
utterance interpretation mechanisms, make-sense frames and cultural frames 
may – all, or each on their own, or in different configurations – contribute to 
creating the comic outcome, is by far the most extensive and comprehensive in-
vestigation of humour conducted along the relevance-theoretic lines.
Incongruity lies at the core of the account of witticisms and funny apho-
risms offered by Curcó (1996).  The author focuses mostly on contradictory 
implicatures supported by various parts of a witty text. This can be illustrated 
by Oscar Wilde’s aphorism: 
(4)  There is something tragic about the enormous number of young men there are 
in England at the present moment who start life with perfect profiles, and end by 
adopting some useful profession. 
The speaker may easily predict that the first part of the saying will activate 
standard cultural assumptions about young people wasting their potential and 
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not getting respectable professions, whereas the final clause is incongruous 
with this initial premise and requires its revision. Based on the observation 
of the speaker’s predicting and manipulating the hearer’s interpretation path 
is Curcó’s insight that humour production and comprehension require high 
mind-reading abilities (the point already emphasized above): understanding 
a joke or a humorous saying may require constructing metarepresentations of 
the fourth order. This squares well with Padilla Cruz’s (2012) claim that humor-
ous communication requires the advanced comprehension strategy known as 
sophisticated understanding (Sperber 1994).  As a non-bona fide mode of com-
munication, joke-telling is taken to involve a kind of deception: the hearer is 
manipulated to recover one interpretation of the text, only to identify another, 
hidden interpretation when the punch-line is reached. According to Padilla 
Cruz (2012), the search for the alternative interpretation is activated thanks to 
the hearer’s vigilance mechanisms. 
Another aspect of humorous communication was brought to light by 
Jodłowiec (1991, 2015), who posited that joke comprehension requires activa-
tion of a broad array of contextual assumptions. Although none of them may 
be specifically intended, or none of them taken individually may be amusing, 
the fact that they are jointly represented in the hearer’s mind results in a spe-
cial cognitive effect, evoking the reaction of mirth in the hearer. In the analyses 
of humour offered in this paper, we will draw on all the previously mentioned 
observations, but our main point will be based on the notion of weak import 
achieved by the punch-line, so we shall present this idea in greater detail, to-
gether with the account of weak communication, in the next section. 
3. A weak communication account of humour 
Since the concept of weak communication (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95; Wil-
son and Sperber 2004, 2012) underlies the claims advanced in this paper, we 
present some of its aspects below. 
Assuming that by producing an utterance the speaker aims at creating 
a certain cognitive effect in the audience, Sperber and Wilson argue that the 
intended cognitive effect may be more or less determinate. In other words, 
in certain communicative situations the comprehender processing an utter-
ance is intended to arrive at a highly predictable and fairly specific range of as-
sumptions whereas in other situations the communicative goal may be just “to 
steer the thoughts of the audience in a certain direction” (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/95: 60), with the gamut of assumptions generated remaining to a large 
degree indeterminate. The former is the case of strong communication, while 
the latter will be placed on the weak end of the communication continuum, 
with a range of different shades between the two extremes. 
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The interpretation process for the two ends of the strong-weak continuum 
can be illustrated by the mini-dialogues in (5) and (6) below: 
(5) a. Peter: Do you like my outfit?
b. Mary: Yes, it looks great. 
(6) a. Peter: Do you like my outfit?
b. Mary (unenthusiastically): Oh my goodness!
Stipulating that Peter’s question in (5a) is about the futuristic alien disguise he 
plans to wear for the fancy dress party that he and his wife are going to, by say-
ing (5b) Mary straightforwardly answers her husband’s question and informs 
him that she thinks his outfit looks great and she likes it. This is where the path 
of least effort aimed at achieving a satisfying range of cognitive effects takes the 
comprehender, who, as a result of processing (5b), arrives at precisely this as-
sumption. Technically, it is on this interpretation that (5b) attains optimal rel-
evance. Since there is a fully determinate assumption intended by the speaker 
in this communicative context, it is a case of strong communication. By con-
trast, what is communicated by (6b) is not so obvious or determinate. Here 
what Mary has said and how she has said it discloses surprise and consterna-
tion, and certainly cannot be interpreted as an approval of Peter’s costume, but 
it would be difficult to pin down exactly what the speaker has conveyed by pro-
ducing (6b). There are a number of different assumptions that her interjection 
makes accessible, for instance, that this is a rather shocking attire and that Pe-
ter looks a bit odd in it, that Mary thinks it is weird and eccentric, that she is 
dismayed by what she is looking at, etc. As can be seen, then, there is no specif-
ic assumption or a fixed set of assumptions that the comprehender is intended 
to generate. Instead, the addressee is encouraged to recover those assumptions 
that become most accessible to him when (6b) is being processed and to stop 
as soon as he finds an interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance. 
Under the circumstances, the speaker’s intention is not fully transparent and 
there is a wide spectrum of assumptions that make her utterance relevant in 
context. In effect, the optimally relevant interpretation that the hearer ends 
up with is not fully controlled by the communicator. As this example demon-
strates, the opacity of the speaker’s intention gives rise to, and at the same time 
endorses, indeterminacy of interpretations typical of weak communication.2
2  The idea that the speaker meaning may be indeterminate to various degrees goes back to 
Grice (1975/89: 39–40), who trying to elucidate the process of implicature generation observed that 
“[s]ince, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to 
preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being observed, and since there may be vari-
ous possible explanations, a list of which may be open, the conversational implicature in such cases will 
be an open disjunction of such specific explanations, and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will 
have just the kind of indeterminacy that many actual implicata do in fact seem to possess.”
33Weak Communication, Joke Targets and the Punch-Line Effect...
The discussion on the role of local and universal elements in jokes offered in 
the next section is based on the claim that the notion of weak communication 
is of key importance for explaining the humorous effect brought about by the 
punch-line in verbal jokes. The general idea is that when the punch-line comes, 
not only does it cause a switch from the initial line of interpretation to the ulti-
mately intended one, as is commonly acknowledged in incongruity-resolution 
approaches (e.g. Suls 1972, 1983; Raskin 1985; Forabosco 1992; Richie 2004; 
Dynel 2012; Yus 2003, 2008, 2013, 2016), but it also makes a vast range of weak-
ly communicated assumptions highly manifest to the joke recipient. This result 
can be described as a cognitive overload effect: an array of assumptions sudden-
ly manifests itself to the interpreter, which leads to an affective response, dis-
charged as laughter. Let us explore in some detail the model of joke production 
and comprehension propounded here by looking at an example. 
(7)  An American, a Russian, a British and a Pole are going by plane. Suddenly the plane 
catches fire and it appears that there are only three parachutes available. The Russian 
grabs the first parachute saying: “As a member of the most intelligent nation I have 
the right to save myself.”  The second parachute is grabbed by the American saying: 
“As a member of the wealthiest nation I have the right to save myself.” The British 
takes the third one and gives it to the Pole saying: “I am a gentleman, you go!” 
“It’s ok, keep it. We both can jump out because the one of the most intelligent nation 
took my rucksack.”
(adapted from: http://iwillmakeyoulaugh.weebly.com/ multicultural-jokes.html)
On the model of joke-processing presented here, when the punch-line is 
reached, a large number of weakly communicated assumptions about boast-
ful but often mindlessly acting Russians, their beliefs that they represent the 
world’s leading superpower, their attitudes of superiority that really conceal 
feelings of inferiority, etc., as well as those about Poles, who are thought to be 
slow and simple-minded but are often lucky and will (eventually) land on their 
feet, etc., become salient in the recipient’s mind. 
This result has to do with the optimally relevant interpretation of the 
punch-line that the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic yields. In the 
context of the most accessible assumptions the final utterance in (7) explicit-
ly communicates that both the British and the Pole can jump from the plane, 
because the Russian made off with the Polish guy’s rucksack, implicating that 
two parachutes are still there to be used.3 This meaning evidently clashes with 
3  To be more exact, the explicature of the punch-line could be spelt out as (6a):
(6) a.  THE POLEX INFORMS THE BRITY THAT BOTH THE POLEX AND THE BRITY 
CAN* JUMP OUT* OF THE PLANEA BECAUSE* THE RUSSIANZ TOOK* THE 
POLEX’S RUCKSACK* BY MISTAKE.
The above is just a schematic representation employed for expository purposes and should 
not be identified as a language of thought formula actually entertained by the comprehender. 
Capitalization is used to indicate that the explicature is composed of concepts which the en-
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the assumptions communicated by the set-up, in particular those related to 
the Russian, who was quick to proclaim himself to represent the most intelli-
gent nation, but who, as it turns out, acted stupidly and made a complete fool 
of himself, plunging to his death. Thus the twist introduced by the punch-line 
results in the remodelling of the initial assumptions: those compatible with the 
set-up (i.e. that the Russian survived because of his self-confidence) are proved 
invalid and are replaced with assumptions reconcilable with meaning of the 
punch-line, which suddenly become highly accessible to the recipient.4
In fact, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to compile a list of the weakly 
communicated assumptions (potentially) triggered by the punch-line. In the 
first place, the assumptions brought to bear in the interpretation process tend 
to be idiosyncratic: they depend to a large extent on the background knowl-
edge stored under the key concepts activated due to linguistic decoding of the 
text, so they differ across individuals. Also, the nature and the scope of their 
activation is subject to variation due to the current psychological state of the 
interpreter: being tired, frustrated or preoccupied with one’s own affairs may 
hamper joke interpretation. By contrast, there may be a true myriad of as-
sumptions manifest when the joke recipient is in a psychological state condu-
cive to mental agility. 
There is another important reason for which it would be counterproduc-
tive to list the weakly communicated assumptions that contribute to humour. 
The point is that in the case of weak communication it often happens that 
apart from one or two assumptions which evidently make the utterance rel-
evant, and therefore are likely to be represented in the comprehender’s mind, 
there will be a number of weakly implicated assumptions that will not be de-
terminate enough to reach a level of actual mental representations during the 
interpretation process. This is precisely the nature of what we are referring to 
as the cognitive overload effect: a number of assumptions become manifest at 
the moment when the punch-line is grasped, but most (if not all of them) re-
main at the “stand-by”, without achieving the status of being mentally repre-
sented. This explains why people who have just laughed at a joke find it noto-
riously difficult to explain what the punch-line actually communicates and to 
coded words provide access to; the asterisks signal that the meanings of these concepts are rel-
evantly adjusted in the context so that the speaker-intended, contextually fine-tuned meaning 
emerges. This kind of meaning modulation is referred to within the relevance-theoretic frame-
work as ad hoc concept construction. For an in-depth discussion on ad hoc concept construction, 
see Sperber and Wilson (1998, 2008), Carston (2002, 2010a, 2010b, 2012), Wilson and Carston 
(2007) and Wilson and Sperber (2004).  
4  It is worth observing that, additionally, there is ironic reference in the punch-line (“the one 
of the most intelligent nation” is evidently used ironically), which adds a bonus to the humour 
here. On the relevance-theoretic treatment of irony, see Sperber and Wilson (1998), Wilson 
(2006, 2009, 2013), Wilson and Sperber (1992, 2012), Piskorska (2016) and Yus (2016).
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comment on what makes it funny: punch-line resolution predominantly takes 
place at the subrepresentational level.
Elucidating the nature of funniness in jokes in terms of weak communica-
tion provides considerable insight into the roles that the set-up (which Hock-
ett (1977) terms build-up) and the punch-line play in creating amusement. 
As pointed out above, the punch-line is responsible for the reorganisation in 
the interpretation frame and the sudden cognitive overload effect, whereas the 
narration that leads to it must ensure that access to certain pieces of back-
ground information is facilitated. In the joke under discussion, the chunks 
of encyclopaedic information stored under such concepts as AMERICANS, 
RUSSIANS, BRITISH and POLES, to mention just the key lexical items from 
the opening line, become readily available in the recipient’s mind. This is cru-
cial for the humorous climax, since the larger the volume of background as-
sumptions potentially salient in the recipient’s mind when the finale comes, 
the vaster the size and the stronger the impact of weakly communicated im-
port at the end of the joke. 
This brings us directly to another important hypothesis about humour that 
this kind of approach supports. The reason why characters, notions, matters, 
themes, etc. well familiar to a given audience are the best candidates for hu-
mour triggers is not only that recipients will be able to draw some inferences 
concerning such characters, themes, etc., but that they will be able to draw in-
ferences of the required kind, i.e. ones likely to lead to the cognitive overload 
effect brought about by the punch-line. The point we are making here does not 
concern the problem of understanding the joke’s content, but evoking a humor-
ous reaction in the recipient by the punch-line even when they have compre-
hended the text. While, as Yus (2016: 241–42) aptly points out, the audience 
will not grasp the joke in (8) below without access to the background infor-
mation that the Shadows used to be Cliff Richard’s backing band, nevertheless, 
this may not be enough to achieve the comic outcome.
(8) Doctor, doctor, I keep thinking I’m Cliff Richard.
You’re a shadow of your former self.
To be amusing, the comprehension of the punch-line must open access to a 
range of assumptions and lead to the cognitive overload effect, which occurs 
when the subject matter is fairly familiar.
Let us consider the two-liner in (9), which in our estimation, makes a rather 
poor candidate for a joke to be successful with a Polish audience, even though 
it is presumably heartily laughed at by New Zealanders.
(9)  Q: What do you call a sophisticated Australian? 
A: A New Zealander. 
(https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/120632325/)
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The problem is that Polish people are not likely to know enough about how 
New Zealanders perceive Australians.5 In fact, it is doubtful that Poles have 
any stereotype of this nationality, so there are not likely to be line-ups of highly 
accessible assumptions about Australians or New Zealanders, hypothesized to 
accompany the punch-line resolution, that might lead to the cognitive over-
load effect in the mind of an average Polish recipient. So even though the joke 
does not seem to pose a challenge on the level of basic comprehension – we 
can actually learn from the punch-line that New Zealanders consider them-
selves superior to Australians, and the inferential path as well as the incongru-
ity-resolution pattern (Yus 2016) will be essentially similar for most audiences 
– the butt of the joke does not open access to the background knowledge re-
sources requisite for the weak implicatures to become manifest, which strips 
the punch-line of the humour-generating potential with the Polish audience. 
We believe that the same effect can be expected to occur in (10). 
(10) Q: What is the difference between yogurt and Australia?
A: Yogurt has some culture. 
However, this joke can be easily tinkered with in order to make it funny for the 
Polish reader: it is enough for “Australian” to be substituted with “a chav.” The 
Polish version then would be:
(11) Czym się różni jogurt od dresiarza?
Jogurt ma przynajmniej jakąś kulturę.
‘What is the difference between yogurt and a chav?
Yogurt has some culture.’
These remarks bring into focus some interesting observations about universal 
and culture specific humour triggers in jokes, which the weak communication 
approach fully accounts for. Let us turn to these now.
4. Universality vs. locality in jokes
It may have been noticed, especially by a careful Polish reader, that the joke in 
(10), while not straightforwardly hilarious for Poles, seems better suited to get 
a little laugh with the Polish audience than the one in (9). Whereas the point of 
humour in both jokes has to do with access to background assumptions about 
nations that are remote from Poles, who – as hinted at above – can be assumed 
to have only rudimentary and superficial knowledge of New Zealanders and 
5  As Chiaro (2011: 367) points out, “humorous discourse relies on implicit encyclopaedic 
knowledge that must be shared between addresser and addressee, between perpetrator and re-
cipient.”
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Australians, the familiar riddle pattern of (10) is likely to make it more amus-
ing for the Polish reader or hearer. So while the alleged contrast between Aus-
tralians and New Zealanders will not produce an abundant crop in terms of 
implicit import weakly communicated by the punch-line in (9), a richer cog-
nitive effect is plausible in the case of (10).6 This joke employs a schema typical 
of numerous jokes starting with an absurd question about a difference between 
two notions that are completely dissimilar, hence the joke-mode of process-
ing may be automatically turned on, leading the hearer to exploring various 
weak assumptions about culture-less groups. Besides, the easily recognisable 
pun on “culture” (which also works for kultura in Polish) introduces the twist 
in the punch-line, possibly bringing about some reorganisation in the assump-
tion pool, which will give rise to a humorous effect.  Even more interestingly, 
modifying (10) into a joke targeting chavs, a group well-known to Polish audi-
ences, as in (11) above, enhances its humour-inducing potential, because then 
the punch-line acquires the capacity to unleash a whole range of weakly com-
municated assumptions concerning the primitiveness, churlishness, imperti-
nence, narrow-mindedness, etc. of the individuals targeted. 
Thus, another dimension to be considered in our discussion on the universal 
vs. the local is the reference to human traits ridiculed in jokes. Despite the fact 
that the scope of joke targets popular in different parts of the world and favoured 
by various communities is both enormous and diverse, as Raskin (1985) ob-
served long ago, there are certain scripts (or cognitive frames or schemas, cf. Yus 
2016: 81–84) associated with some nationalities that are known worldwide and 
universal, that’s why they can be tapped into by joke-tellers almost anywhere. So, 
for instance, the high efficiency of Germans, the preoccupation with sex of the 
French and Latino people, and Jewish canniness, are prominent candidates for 
targets found laughable across the globe (cf. also Popescu 2011).   
Besides, as noted by Davis (2011: 6–7), “Most jokes are about the undesir-
able, for people joke not about good things or virtuous people but about failure 
and wickedness and about matters that they might well find disturbing outside 
the context of the joke.” He goes on to state that “It is difficult to make a joke 
out of a virtue except when it is cultivated to an absurd and inappropriate ex-
tent, by which time most observers will have ceased to regard it as a virtue.” 
Thus, the common denominator for the very different groups ridiculed by joke 
authors is a conspicuous negative characteristic exposed by the assumptions 
that the punch-line makes manifest: one way or another, the joke target is al-
ways portrayed as epitomising something harmful, adverse, detrimental, un-
favourable, etc. In fact, if it is at all possible to identify a universal leitmotif in 
jokes across geographies, cultures and generations, it will be stupidity.
6  Obviously, as Gillota (2013: 5) emphasizes,  “not everybody, even those who share a cul-
tural background, finds the same material funny.”  
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However, to this we would like to add that even if drawing on the same 
theme (like stupidity), the jokes told in different parts of the globe and de-
signed for different audiences, will inescapably be about “local” targets, be-
cause it is only reference to these that will secure a sufficiently rich and abun-
dant weakly communicated import to be generated when the punch-line is 
reached. So the joke below can be adequately modified depending on who it is 
supposed to amuse:
(12)  Two policemen/Polish/Czech hunters /blondes got themselves set up for a weekend 
of bird hunting. They gathered their guns, dogs, and ammunition before tromping 
around for hours with no luck. When they came out of the woods at dusk, they 
looked around at all the other hunters who were carrying braces of pheasant, quail, 
duck, and geese.
“Gee,” said one to the other companion, “everyone else seems to be doing pretty 
well for themselves. What d’you think we could be doing wrong?”
“I haven’t got a clue,” said the other. “Maybe we’re not throwing the dogs high 
enough.”
Even if, for some reason, the protagonists were to be Australians, the compre-
hension path and the incongruity resolution will remain the same for hear-
ers from different national groups exposed to (12). What will change though, 
is the humour-generating potential of the joke. If (12) is about two foolish 
Australians, it is likely to be funny for people in New Zealand and probably 
in the UK, but not necessarily for Poles. This is because, as our weak commu-
nication account predicts, it is only when the target is well-known that the 
cognitive overload effect can arise, eventually leading to amusement. In this 
way, new light is thrown on eligible joke’s butts: only if the butt is familiar to 
the recipient, it will provide access to a wide range of manifest assumptions 
and hence will (at least potentially) fuel humour. This means that while fully 
subscribing to Yus’ (2016: 239) view that when translating jokes “faithfulness 
in reproducing humorous effects is more important than reproducing coded 
content”, we differ in what we consider to be the sine qua non of reproducing 
the humorous effects. Our conception of the punch-line effect emphasizes its 
role in triggering the cognitive overload effect, rather than in achieving dis-
course-based, frame-based or implication-based resolutions (cf. Yus 2016), 
whose existence we do not intend to contest. 
This explains the difficulty with transposing joke (13), in which New Zea-
landers are made fun of, in the way that would make it funny for the Polish re-
cipient.  The problem is that in the Polish context there is no easily accessible 
stereotype of a stupid nation to serve as a paragon of foolishness, and groups 
typically targeted for their alleged stupidity, such as blondes or policemen, do 
not fit the joke scenario, so there is no straightforward substitute for Kiwis as 
referred to in the punch-line.
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(13)  Bruce the Aussie builder was going through a house he had just built for the woman 
who owned it. She was telling him what colour to paint each room. They went into 
the first room and she said “I want this room to be painted a light blue.”
The builder went to the front door and yelled, “GREEN SIDE UP!”  When he went 
back into the house, she told him that the next room was to be bright red. The 
builder went to the front door and yelled, “GREEN SIDE UP!”
When he came back, the woman said “I keep telling you colours, but you go out 
the front and yell ‘green side up’ – what is that for?” The builder said, “Don’t worry 
about that, I’ve just got a couple of Kiwis laying the turf out front.”
(https://www.stuff.co.nz/life-style/life/88788458/10-australia-day-jokes-to-cele-
brate-the-aussie-sense-of-humour)
What’s more, the weak communication approach elucidates the function that 
background knowledge plays in processing jokes: whereas shared subject mat-
ter (Cundall 2007) or the mutuality of information (Yus 2016) may be impor-
tant for understanding what is being communicated, inadequate familiarity 
with the butt inhibits the weak communication impact and jeopardizes the 
joke’s laughter-provoking potential (cf. also fn. 5 above). 
Below is a joke that actually exists in at least two different versions. Its po-
tential for amusing different audiences lies in its reference to stupidity, univer-
sally held in contempt as hinted at above, and, even more importantly, in its 
ability to bring about a vast array of weak assumptions triggered by the activa-
tion of a local stereotype. 
(14) a. A guy walks into a bar and begins to tell a Trump joke.
  The bartender stops him and points out the “Make America Great Again” hats 
everyone else has on. “Still want to tell this joke?”
 “Not if I have to keep explaining it.”
b. A guy walks into a bar and begins to tell a Polish joke. The bartender stops him 
and says “I’m Polish. You see the guy over there – he’s the owner of this bar and 
he’s Polish. You see these two big guys drinking beer beside you – they’re Polish. 
You still want to tell your joke?” The guy thinks about it and says “No, I don’t want 
to tell it anymore. Nobody will get it.”
(https://www.reddit.com/r/Jokes/comments/4zj8rw/a_guy_walks_into_a_bar_
and_begins_to_tell_a/)
The motives behind who laughs at whom depend largely on historical, social 
and economic factors (Davies 2011; Brzozowska 2008; Laineste 2011), the in-
vestigation of which lies beyond the scope of the present paper, concerned 
mostly with the peculiar cognitive climax effect that occurs when the punch-
line is being processed. Suffice it to say that it is natural to hold a stereotype of 
a group with whom one interacts or shares some space in the world. In such 
cases, humour generated by the punch-line, as argued above, necessarily in-
volves a gamut of weakly communicated assumptions originating from a high-
ly accessible stereotype. 
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5. Conclusions
Looking at the joke’s punch-line effect through the weak communication lens, 
while fully compatible with the incongruity theories of humour and in total 
harmony with the comprehensive Intersecting Circles Model of humorous 
communication, appears to reveal an interesting dimension of joke compre-
hension. The inferential pattern that the audience is manoeuvred to follow and 
the surprising finale they discover are hypothesized to climax in an array of 
weakly communicated assumptions when the punch-line is reached. So where-
as the above-mentioned models of humour provide the basis for thought-pro-
voking classifications of different kind (as in Yus 2016), the weak communica-
tion account exposes the common denominator behind various types of jokes 
and affords some insights into the link between the cognitive and the affective 
spheres combined in humour. The cognitive overload effect, posited to be gen-
erated at the subpersonal level and involving mental processes going on in the 
language of thought, may impact the affective domain, which might elucidate 
how the laughter response comes about.  
This account also offers some clarifications with respect to certain charac-
teristics of humour often left unexplored or simply taken for granted. While 
it is commonly observed that a necessary quality for an issue or a group to be 
chosen as a joke target is its saliency for the recipient, the explanations of why 
this is so draw mainly on historical, political and social arguments, which prag-
maticists supplement by arguing that without access to relevant background 
knowledge, the text will not make much sense to the interpreter. The analysis 
of joke processing suggested here adds another dimension to these justifica-
tions. The weak communication impact of the punch-line, it has been argued, 
contributes substantially to the humour-inducing potential of the joke. As il-
lustrated by examples discussed in this paper, although culturally distant jokes 
(as is the case with those originally produced for New Zealanders when trans-
ferred to the Polish context) may not be perceived as completely vexing, they 
fail to evoke amusement due to their lack of potential to activate a wide array 
of weakly communicated assumptions. Therefore, jokes about culturally dis-
tant referents are not amusing, not because they create comprehension prob-
lems, but because they fail to yield a cognitive overload effect. As is claimed 
here, for a joke to evoke mirth, it is not enough to be just understood: it has 
to be interpreted in a way that leads to the vast array of weakly communicated 
assumptions manifest in the mind of the recipient when the punch-line is be-
ing processed. 
It is also worth mentioning that of vital importance in this process is a fa-
miliar joke-telling pattern, such as that of a question-answer or a riddle, and 
a specific make-sense frame employed in a joke (Yus 2013, 2016). These ele-
ments may incite the comprehender to search for relevance of a joke via the 
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weak communication path in which a large number of assumptions, typically 
negative, become accessible to the hearer. 
The reason why New Zealanders laugh at Australians (and vice versa) and 
Poles might more readily laugh at Russians or Germans is that the presence of 
a stereotype of an ethnic or other group is a rich source of assumptions which 
may be activated by a joke set-up and exploited in various ways by the punch-
line.  As this analysis of humour predicts, concepts which afford access to a 
large number of assumptions of the right kind are likely to sow the seeds of 
humour. In the light of the considerations presented above, the national char-
acter of some humorous manifestations seems to be confined to the element of 
a trigger – most often a familiar stereotype that sets off the inferential interpre-
tation processes on the weak communication path.
References
Attardo Salvatore (1993). Violation of conversational maxims and cooperation: The 
case of jokes. Journal of Pragmatics 19, 537–558. 
Attardo Salvatore (2015). Humorous metaphors. In Cognitive Linguistics and Humor 
Research, Geert Brône, Kurt Feyaerts, Tony Veale (eds.), 91–110. Berlin: Mou-
ton De Gruyter.
Attardo Salvatore, Raskin Victor (1991). Script theory revis(it)ed: Joke similarity 
and joke representation model. Humor 4, 293–348. 
Bach Kent (1994). Semantic slack: What is said and more. In Foundations of Speech 
Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, Savas Tsohatzidis (ed.), 
267–291. London: Routledge.
Bach Kent (2010). Impliciture vs. explicature: What’s the difference? In Romero, So-
ria (eds.), 126–137.
Brzozowska Dorota (2008). Polski dowcip etniczny. Stereotyp a tożsamość. Opole: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego.
Carston Robyn (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit Commu-
nication. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Carston Robyn (2010a). Lexical pragmatics, ad hoc concepts and metaphor: From a 
relevance theory perspective. Italian Journal of Linguistics 22(1), 153–180.
Carston Robyn (2010b). Metaphor, ad hoc concepts, literal meaning and mental im-
ages. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3), 295–321.
Carston Robyn (2010c). Explicit communication and ‘free’ pragmatic enrichment. In  
Romero, Soria (eds.), 217–285. 
Carston Robyn (2012). Word meaning and concept expressed. The Linguistic Review 
29(4), 607–623. 
Chiaro Delia (2011). Comic takeover or comic makeover?: Notes on humour trans-
lating, translation and (un)translatability. In Dynel (ed.), 365–378.
Chłopicki Władysław (2017). Metonymy in humour. In Humorous Discourse, Władysław 
Chłopicki, Dorota Brzozowska (eds.), 23–52, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
42 Agnieszka Piskorska, Maria Jodłowiec
Cundall Michael (2007). Humour and the limits of incongruity. Creativity Research 
Journal 19, 203–211.
Curcó Carmen (1996).  The implicit expression of attitudes, mutual manifestness and 
verbal humour. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 8, 89–99.
Davies Christie (2011). Jokes and targets. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Dynel Marta  (2009). Humorous Garden Paths: A Pragmatic-Cognitive Study. Newcas-
tle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Dynel Marta (2011a). Blending the incongruity-resolution model and the conceptual 
integration theory: The case of blends in pictorial advertising. International Review 
of Pragmatics 3, 59–83. 
Dynel Marta (ed.) (2011b). The Pragmatics of Humor across Discourse Domains, Am-
sterdam: John Benjamins.
Dynel Marta (2012). Garden paths, red lights and crossroads: On finding our way to 
understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying jokes. Israeli Journal of Hu-
mor Research 1(1), 6–28.
Forabosco Giovannantonio (1992). Cognitive aspects of the humor process: The 
concept of incongruity. Humor 5(1/2), 45–68. 
Gillota David (2013). Ethnic Humor in Multiethnic America. New Brunswick: Rut-
gers University Press. 
Grice H. Paul (1975/89). Logic and conversation. In Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech 
Acts, Peter Cole, Jerry Morgan (eds.), 41–58. New York: Academic Press; reprint-
ed in Studies in the Way of Words, H. Paul Grice, 1989, 22–40. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Hamblin Jennifer, Gibbs Raymond W. (2003). Processing the meanings of what 
speakers say and implicate. Discourse Processes 35(1), 59–80.
Hockett Charles (1977). Jokes. In The View from Language: Selected Essays, 1948–
1974, Charles Hockett (ed.), 257–289. Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press.
Jodłowiec Maria (1991). The Role of Relevance in the Interpretation of Verbal Jokes: 
A Pragmatic Analysis. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Ph.D. thesis.
Jodłowiec Maria (2015). The Challenges of Explicit and Implicit Communication. 
A Relevance-Theoretic Approach. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Jodłowiec Maria, Piskorska Agnieszka (2017). The dynamism of context: A rele-
vance-theoretic approach. Paper delivered at the 18th Szklarska Poręba Workshop 
on the Roots of Pragmasemantics “The Role of Context and Reasoning in Com-
munication”, Szklarska Poręba  3–6 March, 2017.
Laineste Liisi (2011). Politics of taste in a post-Socialist state: A case study. In Studies 
in Political Humour, Villy Tsakona, Diana E. Popa (eds.), 217–241. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins. 
Levinson Stephen (2000). Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversa-
tional Implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McGraw Peter, Warner Joel (2014). The Humor Code: A Global Search for What 
Makes Things Funny. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Padilla Cruz Manuel (2012). Epistemic vigilance, cautious optimism and sophisti-
cated understanding. Research in Language 10(4), 365–386. 
Piskorska Agnieszka (2016). Echo and inadequacy in ironic utterances. Journal of 
Pragmatics 101, 54–65.
43Weak Communication, Joke Targets and the Punch-Line Effect...
Popescu Carmen (2011). Understanding ethnic humour in Romanian jokes. In 
Dynel (ed.), 173–190. 
Raskin Victor (1985). Semantic Mechanisms of Humor. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Recenati Françoise (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Richie Graeme (2004 ). The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes. London: Routledge.  
Romero Esther, Soria Belén (eds.) (2010). Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston’s 
Pragmatics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sperber Dan (1994). Understanding verbal understanding. In What is Intelligence? 
Jean Khalfa (ed.), 179–198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber Dan, Wilson Deirdre (1986/95). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber Dan, Wilson Deirdre (1998). Irony and relevance. A reply to Seto, Hama-
moto and Yamanashi. In Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications, Robyn 
Carston, Seiji Uchida (eds.), 283–293. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Sperber Dan, Wilson Deirdre (2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. 
Mind & Language 17(1–2), 3–23. 
Sperber Dan, Wilson Deirdre (2008). A deflationary account of metaphors. In The 
Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, Raymond Gibbs (ed.), 84–105. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suls Jerry M. (1972). A two-stage model for the appreciation of jokes and cartoons. In 
The Psychology of Humour. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues. Jeffrey H. 
Goldstein, Paul E. McGhee (eds.), 81–100. New York: Academic Press. 
Suls Jerry M. (1983). Cognitive processes in humor appreciation. In Handbook of Hu-
mor Research, Vol. 1, Paul E. McGhee, Jeffrey H. Goldstein (eds.), 39–57. New 
York: Springer Verlag.
Turner Mark (2010). Blending box experiments, Build 1.0, Working Paper website 
http://markturner.org/blending.html, access 10.11.2015.
Wilson Deirdre (2006). The pragmatics of verbal irony: echo or pretence? Lingua 116, 
1722–1743. 
Wilson Deirdre (2009). Irony and metarepresentation. UCL Working Papers in Lin-
guistics 21, 183–226.
Wilson Deirdre (2013). Irony comprehension: a developmental perspective. Journal 
of Pragmatics 59, 40–56. 
Wilson Deirdre, Carston Robyn (2007). A unitary approach to lexical pragmatics: 
Relevance, inference and ad hoc concepts. In Pragmatics, Noel Burton-Roberts 
(ed.), 230–259. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wilson Deirdre, Sperber Dan (1992). On verbal irony. Lingua 87, 53–76. 
Wilson Deirdre, Sperber Dan (2004). Relevance theory. In The Handbook of Prag-
matics, Laurence Horn and Gregory Ward (eds.), 607–632. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wilson Deirdre, Sperber Dan (2012). Explaining irony. In Wilson, Sperber (eds.), 
123–145.
Wilson Deirdre, Sperber Dan (eds.) (2012). Meaning and Relevance. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Yus Francisco (2003). Humor and the search for relevance. Journal of Pragmatics 
35(9), 1295–1331. 
44 Agnieszka Piskorska, Maria Jodłowiec
Yus Francisco (2008). A relevance-theoretic classification of jokes. Lodz Papers in 
Pragmatics 4, 131–157.
Yus Francisco (2013). An inference-centered analysis of jokes: The Intersecting Circles 
Model of humorous communication. In Irony and Humor: From Pragmatics to Dis-
course, Leonor Ruiz Gurillo, Maria Belén Alvarado (eds.), 59–82. Amsterdam 
and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Yus Francisco (2016). Humour and Relevance. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Agnieszka Piskorska
Instytut Anglistyki
Uniwersytet Warszawski
ul. Hoża 69
00-681 Warszawa 
[a.piskorska(at)uw.edu.pl]
Maria Jodłowiec
Instytut Filologii Angielskiej
Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Al. Mickiewicza 9A
31-120 Kraków
[maria.jodlowiec(at)uj.edu.pl]
